This paper proposes a fully micro-founded framework that incorporates optimizing banks, into a DSGE model, and evaluates the role of banks and financial shocks in the Iranian business cycles. We assume banks that offer different banking services and interact in an interbank market. Loans are produced using interbank borrowing and drposit. Banks have monopoly power, but cannot set nominal deposit and prime lending rates. The model also includes financial and unconventional monetary policy shocks. The main findings are that: (1) The model captures the key features of the Iranian economy; (2) bank behavior substantially affects credit supply conditions and the transmission of different shocks; (3) financial shocks have significant effects on the Iranian business cycle fluctuations.
This paper explain two Phenonenon. First, Banks confront with various risks because they play an important role in the financing. These risks include first the risk of mismatch between assets and liabilities that they will confront a shortage of liquidity and liquidity risk. Banks when confront with shortage liquidity can borrow from the central bank through the credit lines or other banks that have excess fund. Borrowing from the central bank has inflationary effects while the transfer of surplus funds from institutions with excess liquidity to institutions with liquidity shortage will have not an inflationary effect. second banks have credit risk, because firms default their borrowing of banks. Interbank market is one component of money market where banks and other credit institutions engage in transactions with each other for short-term financing. This market plays two vital roles in new financial systems. The first and most important role is the central bank leading to intervene actively and effectively in the implementation of monetary policy through interest rates. Second, efficient interbank markets, transfer liquidity satisfactory from financial institutions with surplus funds to institutions with deficit funds. Second, this paper assumes defaults on banking credit and interbank borrowing. because of relationship with the Banks in interbank market and the real economy, any kind of risk a bank can also transfer to other banks and to the real sector. If Borrowing from the interbank market, which is a type of short-term financing, is defaulted, will reduce the bank's credit rating and its credit strength. So in this article, the default of banking credit and interbank borrowings designed in the context of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study and analyze the real effects. The overall structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents Methodology. Section 3 gives literature review. Section 4 present the model. The parameter estimation represent at section 5.Section 6 present Impulse-response Function. conclusion has discribed at section 7.
2. Methodology 2.1 Banks and Interbank Markets Banks are a particular type of economic entity, characterized by the provision of maturity transformation to other agents within the economy. This brings with it a particular kind of risk to which any bank is necessarily exposed. This risk consists of the different maturity profiles of the assets and liabilities in its portfolio, since it is usually not possible to match any sudden outows from deposits with inflows from a portfolio of loans. The management of this phenomenon is a major part of a bank's business. In order to meet expected withdrawals, some proportion of total deposits is kept in the form of reserves (for example as deposits with central banks) and a stock of liquid short term assets is generally kept on the balance sheet. Since reserves generally earn a much lower return than funds invested in other financial assets or loans, there exists a trade-off between safety and profitability. Reserves are also used by banks to settle transactions between each other as part of normal business. When a depositor of one bank withdraws funds and uses them in a transaction, a different individual will ultimately deposit them with a (potentially) different bank. This requires a transfer of reserve funds from one bank to another. This type of transfer, of which millions occur on any given day, will affect the reserve holdings of individual banks, but would not affect the aggregate stock of reserves. Apart from transactions between the Treasury and the central bank, there are only two forces which may change this aggregate. The first is obvious: if the depositor withdrew the funds and held them in the form of cash without depositing them, there would be a debit from his banks' reserve account, but no credit to any other bank. The total stock would thus have decreased. Of course, the converse process also occurs on a daily basis.
However, the total stock of reserves does not generally change a great deal, since the popular requirement for physical cash is relatively stable. The other force which may change reserve holding, namely the central bank itself, may be more important in that sense. Modern central banks have three different means of injecting or withdrawing reserves from the system. By far the most commonly used are their open market operations, which are in effect auctions aimed at buying or selling reserve funds in order to change the aggregate. When a bank finds itself in the difficult position of facing a liquidity shock large enough to prompt an immediate requirement for additional reserves, it may also access discount lending facilities. Since these programs charge interest some margin above policy rates and need for them signals some failure in liquidity management, these emergency facilities are used more rarely. It should be noted then that the interbank market in which banks trade reserve funds do not affect the aggregate stock of reserves. Instead, they can only serve to help banks in their individual reserve management. This implies that there are two sides to any trade in this market. On one hand, those banks which believe that their depositor's liquidity needs will be low for a given period may choose to reduce their holding of reserves without fully committing to lending the funds as illiquid loans into the real economy. On the other, should a bank's estimation turn out to be incorrect, the difference can be made up quickly within the market by borrowing or lending funds and thus balancing the books. Interbank Markets are then credit markets, in structure somewhat similar to any other such market. Although they are of particular importance to the functioning of the monetary system, in principle lending banks face credit risks not dissimilar to those they face when lending to other types of agents in the economy. Although such risks were previously considered to be very low, the financial crisis of 2007/2008 highlighted that their management can be critical to the funding strategy and indeed survival of a large financial institution. (Weltewitz(2009) ).
Recent Theoretical Developments in the Analysis of Interbank Term Structures
Perhaps the closest paper in intention to the proposed thesis is being developed by Heider, Hoerova & Holthausen (2009) , who present a model of an interbank market under adverse selection. In keeping with much of the modelling of banks, some proportion of the market in their model suffers a liquidity shock as impatient consumers withdraw their endowments. Banks must decide whether to invest those endowments in a liquid short-term or asset or a risky, illiquid long term alternative. When they face withdrawals, they must then choose whether to liquidate some of their long-term assets or keep them to maturity and instead secure funding for the meantime from other banks. Due to the difference in riskiness between long-term assets (the precise knowledge of which is private), some banks will be willing to lend, while others become borrowers. Since those banks with a safer asset are assumed to be able to liquidate it at a lower cost, they are the first ones to do so should the interbank interest rate increase beyond a critical value. This gives rise to an adverse selection problem. The authors derive a risk premium, which increases unequivocally as adverse selection becomes a bigger problem, meaning when the expected riskiness of long-term assets increases. Indeed, the authors show that it is possible that the interbank market breaks down entirely, given sufficiently risky assets. Although this analysis is close in spirit to the one proposed here, its approach is fundamentally different. In Heider et al.'s (2009) paper, interbank markets are defined to have only one maturity. By using the methodology of game theory, it is proposed in this thesis that asymmetric information and increased perceived riskiness does in fact have an impact across the entire term structure of contracts traded between banks. One of the more recent applications of screening methods is presented by Acharya & Viswanathan (2008) , who introduce asset pricing in their bidimensional loan contract model in which firms pledge collateral to counteract a moral hazard situation in a credit market. Since the authors introduce a delay in asset liquidation when firms fail to repay loans, liquidity shocks can have a contagion effect in their model. As in Bester (1987) , credit rationing would occur in a pooling equilibrium and as a result, pledging cash collateral is an optimal strategy, requiring sales of assets by the borrower. By modelling a market for asset sales the authors establish that by posting collateral, not only is rationing weakened, but asset prices are actually more stable than would have been the case otherwise. The relationship between asset pricing and credit markets is obviously a direct link with the proposed research. Another model of immediate significance to the research question is presented in Freixas & Jorge (2008) , which focuses on modeling interbank markets. In particular it makes use of a screening game to explain why a lending channel of monetary transmission may exist. As such it is a model of the interbank market at the core of the broader term structure. In their model, Freixas & Jorge demonstrate a situation in which banks in interbank markets can be rationed, and thus are unable to provide funds to positive NPV projects in the real economy. The authors produce this result by referring to a chance that banks suffering large liquidity shocks may borrow in order to finance a private benefits project. In the ensuing screening game (in which contracts are defined in terms of an interest rate and loan size), borrowing banks that are undertaking this gamble want to maximize the loan they take out. Indeed it is shown that there exists a loan size above which only such bad banks" would be attracted and lenders would thus have an incentive to decrease the size, resulting in Type I credit rationing. 3 literature review After the banking crisis at 2007, the importance of relationship banking sector with the real sector was more than ever before. So modeling the transmission of shocks from the banking sector to the real sector was entered into the DSGE models. In the literature on closed economy models, the two main ways in which an active banking system is incorporated into DSGE models with financial friction, is through the external finance premium proposed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(BGG, 1999) or through Collateral constraint tied to real estate values for enterpreneurs proposed in Iacoviello(2005) . Gerali and et(2010) , Smits and Wouters(2007) designed DSGE models based on the framework of the banking sector, the households and firms. While the banking sector and financial intermediaries receive deposits from households and supply credit to firms. Iacoviello (2011) introduces a banking sector with one bank and focuses on how financial shocks(repayment shocks) affect an economy with patient and impatient households. This group studies have not been addressed the role of the interbank market at the balance sheet shocks transmitted to the real economy. But the effect of shocks as banks 'default shocks on the real sector has been discussed. The results represent reduced credit supply and thus reduce economic growth. In another group of studies, have entered interbank at DSGE model. Giri (2014) has considered two types of banks. Banks are faced with shortage liquidity for credit supply and thus borrowing from the interbank market and giving credit to the real sector, the second group of banks that have excess funds, lend to interbank and invest less risky assets such as bonds. results suggest that Credit shocks in the interbank market, has reduced the supply of loans from the banking sector to the real sector of the economy, then has reduced Investment and economic growth.
Another hand the credit shock in the interbank market raise the interest rates of credit at the interbank market. Dib(2010) While modeling the interbank market, has assumed Banks are related together through the interbank market. Banks financed through borrowing from the interbank market and Capital. Banks have monopoly power to set interest rates on deposits and loans. Combined portfolio and leverage ratios are determined exclusively. They May be related defaulted the borrowings from other banks. In addition shocks starting from the banking system, are also investigated monetary policy shocks. The main findings of the paper show default at the interbank market and reducing the bank's capital has a negative effect on production. Deposits and borrowings from the interbank market affect the supply of credit and production. If increases default of borrowing from other banks in the interbank market, will increase inflation and interest rate policy. De Walque and et al (2010) , are considered Interbank market and regulatory sectors at DSGE. In this model have considered the interaction between the banking system and the real sector of the economy and importance of stabilize the financial sector and regulatory policy. In this model, three assumptions have been considered. First, firms face with default regarding the banks. Second Banks in the interbank market are confront with nonperforming loan. Lack of liquidity at interbank Are compensated with injection liquidity from central bank. Results indicate that non performing at firms Causes nonperforming at interbank, then reduce supply credit and growth but increase inflation. 4 Structure of the model As pointed out by Giri (2014) , we assume banking sector confront with shortage of liquidity and borrow from interbank. Like De Walque and et al (2010) , is assumed banks borrow from interbank, but they don't pay off timely. We suppose nonperforming loan at interbank, because in recent years some banks have not reimburse timely their borrowing from interbank. Continue this process, interbank market can be confront with risk of non-repay fund and due to the significant role of the banking system in financial markets will be Deleterious effects on macroeconomic variables such as output and inflation.
4.1 Households Households are constrained and decide the amount of consumption, the amount of labor they wish to supply to the production sector and the amount of liquidity according to the following utility function:
(1) 
Intermediate producer
Production sector, characterized by monopolistic competition and Rotenberg pricing, adopts a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with capital t k , and labor t N , subject to productivity shocks.
is elasticity of production with respect to capital. ) 8 (
That t A is technology shock.at the beginning of the every period, Each firm j receives jt l from the bank and is financing t  proportion of cost of capital stock and labor. t  Is: r they don't want claim to firms, because claim to interbank is riskless and high yield, then decrease claim to firms. Banks need a certain amount of borrowing from interbank and deviation from steady state equilibrium condition makes them quadratic cost:
Commercial banks
Where di  is quadratic cost parameters.
i t  Is non-repayment ratio of due to interbank. If banks cannot repayment timely, they are confronted with cost: 
Balance sheet of banks is:
(1 )
Where t  is reserve requirement.
Banks maximize profit subject to
i t d , i t l , t d .
Central bank
Central bank is able to set loan interest rate and reserve requirement. Loan Interest rate is:
Market Clearing
In equilibrium the output and liquidity market must be clear. 
Calibrated Parameters
We fix some parameters, because they are either notoriously difficult to estimate or because they are better identified using other information. Adjusted cost of capital, adjusted cost of inflation, 
Priors and posterior estimates
Priors and posterior estimates are reported in 
Impulse responses
In this section we want to assess whether and how the transmission of Shocks is affected by bank intermediaries in the context of the close economy with interbank. We consider three shocks.
The first is financial shock, while the second is monetary policy shock(demand shock). The third is thechnology shock(supply shock).
Financial shocks
The introduction of the nonperforming loan(npl) shock is to understand the effects of credit losses originating in production sector on business cycles.If subprimers pay back less than expected, bank suffers a loan loss and a reduction in bank capital. As a result, banks either raise new capitl or reduce lending if raising new capital is difficult. Hence, the reduction in bank credit propagates the recessions. is another Channel to propagate business cycles. This paper also expect that the banking attenuator effect refers to a sluggish and heterogenous pass-through of the change the interest rate to monopolistically competitive banks. Here we are not going to highlight how each channel affects the transmission of monetary policy shock, but focus on the role of the banking sector.
Central bank increase interest rate, this policy has two effect on banks. First because of the raising loan interest rate, interest revenue increase and banks increase deposit rate while attract more deposit. Household decrease consumption and more save. The raising of deposit leads to a further increase in credit. As a result, investment and output increase and inflation decrease.
Second, raising in lending rates will increase the interbank market interest rate. Because of rising interbank market interest rate, due to banking system decrease. Figure 4 Shows the impacts of positive technology shock on the Iranian economy. Since the production is more efficient, output rises. The Supply of goods increases, thus reducing the price of the goods. The technology innovation reduces marginal costs and inflation, which leads to a drop in loan rate. Households raise their saving and entrepreneurs borrow more. Because of the rising savings, the marginal product of labor increases so that the aggregate capital increases.
Thechnology Shock
The rising in consumption leads to a rising demand for goods, therefore raising inflation. Central bank raises the loan rate.
In the presence of bank intermediaries, the endogenous propagation mechanism is amplified because credit spreads benefits enterpreneurs from the greater availability of credit.
Enterpreneurs borrow more and product more. Because of raising production, inflation decrease. 
